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OF CULTURAL DETERMINISM AND THE 
LIMITS OF LAW 
Paul R. Dimond* 
Gene Sperling** 
CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY?. By Thomas Sowell. New 
York: William Morrow & Co. 1984. Pp. 164. $11.95. 
According to Thomas Sowell, the civil rights community is pos-
sessed by a vision that sees all differences between racial and ethnic 
groups and the genders in income, prestige, mobility, and residential 
location as being possibly caused only by two factors: innate inferi-
ority or discrimination. Because notions of innate inferiority have be-
come so morally repugnant, discrimination is seen as the cause of the 
large gaps between different groups in our society (pp. 15-21). 
Sowell rebuts this supposed civil rights "rhetoric" with a dose of 
harsh social-Darwinist "reality": cultural factors are largely responsi-
ble for the inferior and segregated status of blacks in America (pp. 19, 
29, 45), and only a rugged intra-group commitment by minority indi-
viduals to compete effectively can close the current social and income 
gaps. For proof of his vision, Sowell cites the relative success of 
groups that historically have been the objects of discrimination and of 
charges of innate inferiority, for example, Jews, Japanese and Chinese 
all over the world, and West Indians in the United States (pp. 26-29, 
31, 47, 77-79, 130-31). 
Based on his alternative vision, Sowell offers the following points 
of guidance to a society concerned with social equality: 
(1) Affirmative action remedies designed to redress systemic inju-
ries caused by past discrimination are inappropriate because cultural 
differences explain the relatively inferior status of blacks and women. 
Female-headed households, especially those headed by black females 
in urban ghettoes, are for Sowell a prime example of how the lower 
status of a group evolves through cultural factors rather than through 
discrimination (pp. 48, 74-82). 
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(2) Affirmative action benefits primarily those blacks already more 
advantaged (e.g., credentialed, middle-class blacks, mostly in two-par-
ent households) and makes more disadvantaged blacks (e.g., poor, un-
credentialed blacks, predominantly in female-headed households) 
worse off by securing racially earmarked benefits for the few at the 
expense of neutral, free market conditions that would aid the many 
(pp. 51-53, 86-90, 110). 
(3) Calls for affirmative action serve to politicize racial and ethnic 
differen~ which, in tum, can lead to racial polarization, barbarism, 
or even genocide by the majority against the minority group seeking 
racial preferences (pp. 33-35, 90, 118). 
(4) Unnamed (except for Andrew Young (p. 139)) civil rights 
leaders, as well as federal judges, who have cited discrimination as the 
cause of inferior black status and espoused affirmative action as the 
remedy, have contributed to a decline in community and personal 
standards and in family responsibility among many blacks today (pp. 
85, 118-20), and to the growing racial intolerance of so many whites 
(pp. 118-19). 1 
(5) Law, political effort, and governmental action are unable to 
alter cultural patterns (pp. 19-21, 29-33, 48-50, 74).2 Sowell's attack on 
the limits of law and political action runs deep: such action is "neither 
necessary nor sufficient for economic advancement" (p. 32) and has 
had an "unpromising record" (p. 35) as a means for raising the in-
comes of low-income groups; indeed, legal and political action has 
contributed to "counter-chauvinism" by the dominant groups in soci-
ety against minorities (pp. 33-34). He argues that many ethnic groups 
even prospered under diverse regimes of discrimination although, at 
least as Sowell would have it, immigrant Germans "were notorious for 
their non-participation in politics in colonial Pennsylvania,"3 the Chi-
nese "have studiously avoided politics" (p. 30), and "Jews only belat-
1. Sowell's attempt to blame modem civil rights advocates for white backlash is rather like 
blaming Frederick Douglass for slavery or W.E.B. DuBois for Jim Crow segregation because 
they chose to protest such racial subjugation directly. Sowell fears that as long as blacks blame 
the white majority for their downtrodden status they will be diverted from the task of pulling 
themselves up. See pp. 85, 118-20. Yet Jesse Jackson's educational excellence program and 
voter registration drive, as well as his presidential candidacy, illustrate that calls for black self-
reliance can be made while challenging whites to confront, rather than rationalize, existing racial 
inequalities. Dr. Martin Luther King, W.E.B. DuBois, and Frederick Douglass provide other 
examples of black civil rights advocates who called for self-reliance while at the same time inspir-
ing frontal challenges to discrimination, segregation and slavery. See text at notes 21, 22, 29, 42 
infra. 
2. The debate over the limits of law and the impact of public values and norms on cultural 
folkways and social inequality has been longstanding. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896), with Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also A. BICKEL, POLITICS 
AND THE WARREN CoURT (1965); R. CoVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975); 0. FISS, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OP LAW (1969). 
3. P. 30 (emphasis in original). 
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edly sought public office" (p. 31).4 For Sowell, "[g]roups that have the 
skills for other things seldom concentrate on politics" (p. 32). 
I. COMPETING VISIONS 
Recognition of the causal power of cultural factors in determining 
inequalities between racial groups and the counterproductive force of 
affirmative action and civil rights rhetoric is Sowell's cornerstone for 
hard-headed public policy today. Sowell proposes that Brown v. Board 
of Education5 and the Civil Rights Act of 19646 be understood simply 
as outlawing all forms of invidious discrimination against individuals 
by mandating strict race neutrality (pp. 37-38). From this perspective, 
Sowell proclaims that affirmative race-conscious remedies are counter-
4. Sowell's contention that the minority groups that have prospered have generally been 
apolitical is subject to dispute. Consider a few counterexamples. After using organized protest to 
combat hotel discrimination against Jews as early as 1877, see L. DAWIDOWICZ, ON EQUAL 
TERMS: JEWS IN AMERICA, 1881-1981, at 40-41 (1980), American Jews "mounted a successful 
campaign to prohibit discrimination in places of public accommodation in 1913." N. CoHEN, 
NOT FREE TO DESISr: THE AMERICAN JEWISH CoMMITIEE 1906-1966, at 384 (1972). In 
Woodrow Wilson's administration, Jews were "thrilled" by the influence of Bernard Baruch, 
Louis D. Brandeis and Henry Morgenthau. L. FucHS, THE PoLmCAL BEHAVIOR OF AMERI-
CAN JEWS 60 (1956). In 1930, Jews were elected governors of New Mexico (Arthur Seligman), 
Illinois (Henry Homer), and Oregon (Julius Meier), and Franklin D. Roosevelt won the New 
York governorship with a Jewish running mate, Herbert Lehman. Id. at 68-69. And during 
F.D.R.'s reign, anti-Semitic charges of something like favoritism were made because of the over-
whelming political support of Jews for Roosevelt and because of the many Jewish advisors on 
whom he relied (e.g., Lehman, Morgenthau, Felix Frankfurter, and Anna Rosenberg). Id. at 99. 
According to Lawrence Fuchs, however, "If Jews had not rewarded their friends with votes they 
would certainly be different from any other group which has ever crossed the American political 
scene." Id. at 60 (emphasis added). 
The Japanese have also been politically active. At the turn of the century, for example, they 
organized "demonstrations and meetings of their own . . • , mak[ing] thousands of speeches and 
publish[ing] dozens of books and pamphlets" in successfully opposing their inclusion in the 1902 
Chinese Exclusion Act. R. DANIELS, THE PoLmCS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE 
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 23 (1968). When 
herded into concentration camps on the West Coast, the Japanese challenged such action 
through what they felt was the most politically feasible alternative: litigation. See Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), particularly the 200-page amicus brief filed by the Japanese-
American Citizens League. To the degree the Japanese did try to keep a low profile politically, it 
obviously did not prevent racial backlash. See generally P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). 
From 1950 to 1952, Mike Masoka, the president of the Japanese-American Citizens League, "a 
powerful and effective lobbyist in the House and Senate," initiated and helped steer through a 
provision in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act eliminating some of the discrimination against Japa-
nese-Americans. M. FuKUDA, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS 69-71 (1980). 
Sowell also continually refers to the apolitical nature of the Chinese. Pp. 20, 27-30, 33. Like 
blacks, however, the Chinese have for more than a century coordinated their protest efforts 
through a carefully designed litigation strategy, of which Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886), is only the most prominent result. See also McClain, The Chinese Struggle for Civil 
Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 529, 567 
(1984) ("The enactment of section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 should be seen as the 
culmination of a long, patient struggle by the leadership of the mid-nineteenth century Chinese 
immigrant community to achieve basic civil rights and to secure for themselves the principle of 
equal treatment under law."). 
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 101 et seq., 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
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productive aberrations. 7 
The premise of this view of social reality is that discrimination can 
best be understood by scrutinizing separately the racial content of each 
isolated transaction (e.g., securing a house, a job, an education, or a 
bus seat) without regard to the larger context in which those decisions 
take place. Discrimination occurs, and personal freedom is denied, 
only if a particular decisionmaker intentionally imposes racial barriers 
to an individual exchange. Although some groups and individuals can 
overcome such barriers solely on the strength of their own drives and 
because of the limited ability of any authority positively to impose dis-
crimination (pp. 26-29, 31, 47, 77-79, 130-31), Sowell concedes that 
isolated racial hurdles which exist under the law should nevertheless 
be stricken for the sake of a color-blind public morality (pp. 37-38).8 
To one, like Sowell, who insists on the view that civil rights issues 
arise only in the context of isolated transactions, race-conscious reme-
dies are anathema. Such group remedies sweep far beyond any indi-
vidual wrongs and, at best, give unjustified advantages to members of 
the minority group who have suffered no harm, while imposing costs 
on innocent whites who have done no wrong.9 At worst, affirmative 
7 .. See pp. 33-35, 39-42, 61-69, 139. 
8. In defining his civil rights "reality" in the contexts of employment, pp. 37-42, 59, and 
school desegregation, pp. 61-69, Sowell assumes that once an individual is theoretically free to 
engage in transactions, his civil rights problems as such are over. Seep. 139; but see note 9 infra. 
Sowell ignores the possibility that systemic effects of past discrimination may obstruct the formal 
"free choice" of the individual. See U.S. CoMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION, 1966-67, at 88 (1967), quoted in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 
440-41 n.S (1968) (discussed at note SO infra). Not surprisingly, Sowell is touted by Assistant 
Attorney General W. Bradford Reynolds in support of the notion that color-blind public moral-
ity is the only defensible national policy. See W. Reynolds, The Department of Justice Looks at 
EEO Enforcement (Jan. 22, 1982) (text of speech on file at Michigan Law Review). 
9. Imagine, however, a country in which a color line has been drawn by the white majority, 
on one side of which whites can live and on the other blacks must reside. Whites maintain signs 
declaring the racial divide for several generations. An anti-majoritarian court then declares such 
forced segregation illegal. The white majority responds by taking down the signs and forbidding 
any affirmative relief on the grounds that (1) the higher law now requires absolute color blind-
ness, (2) no individual is formally subject to racial proscriptions any longer, and (3) current white 
families are not responsible for the caste restrictions imposed by their forebears on blacks. 
Although we concede that the reality of discrimination in America has always been considerably 
more complex, imposing a color-blind standard on a racially skewed gameboard can be under-
stood as freezing in the systemic bias of the prior discrimination, thereby allowing it to continue 
to work against the current members of the racial minority. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 
U.S. 39, 41 (1971); North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971); Regents of the 
Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion); Marshall, A 
Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006, 
1006 (1984) (discussing the inappropriateness of applying an "ideal society" principle of "color-
blindness" in a society "still permeated by racial discrimination and . • . by the traces of racial 
oppression"). 
While the exact relationship between such a caste system and economic and career opportuni-
ties cannot be calibrated precisely, neither can the reality of some causal nexus be dismissed. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395-96 (Marshall, J., separate opinion). One can only speculate on how many 
life chances are denied and networks of opportunity foreclosed to minority children confined to 
urban and rural ghettoes as compared to their white counterparts. See Carter, The Freedom 
Train Has Lost Its Momentum, Wall St. J., June 21, 1984, at 35, col. 6 ("Ask any black youngster 
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action and school busing, for example, serve to rekindle the racialism 
that leads to backlash as newly aggrieved whites strike back. 
There is, however, a different vision of social reality, one which is 
neither so simplistic as Sowell's caricature of civil rights rhetoric nor 
as narrow as Sowell's own view. Under this view, individual transac-
tions are seen as taking place in the context of larger markets and 
social spheres that have been shaped by a variety of factors that are 
subject to some influence, for good or ill, by public action and con-
certed private effort. Although causal connections are neither simple 
nor capable of precise delineation, there remains real concern that in-
stitutional bias and systemic discrimination have left enduring barriers 
that continue to obstruct the opportunities of members of historically 
victimized groups. 
The recognition that such caste wrong persists does not lead one 
who holds this view to attribute all current disparities directly to his-
toric grievances. Neither does it absolve individual members of minor-
ity groups from taking personal responsibility for their own fates. But 
this approach does not permit causal uncertainty and complexity to be 
used as rationalizations for excusing the historic majority from con-
fronting the continuing legacy of racial discrimination. This anti-caste 
view recognizes that all individuals have a basic right to be free from 
any systemic headwinds of lingering discrimination, while society as a 
whole has an obligation to assist members of historic outgroups to join 
the mainstream.10 There may be transactional costs, inefficiencies and 
dislocations along the way, but something more than a micro-level 
zero-sum game is at stake: Making room at the top does not necessar-
ily require a free fall at the bottom. 11 Such a reconstruction process 
requires all of the institutions in our democracy - and the people -
to consider diverse remedies and programs that do something more 
than just declare proven discrimination unlawful. 12 
in any city whether he and his friends have anything in common with their white contemporaries 
in the suburbs, and you'll be lucky if he only laughs in your face. They might as well be living on 
different planets, and the gulf is growing."). 
10. See generally Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1983). 
11. For example, the conflict between protecting seniority status and protecting affirmative 
action plans can be alleviated by choosing not to lay off anyone or by implementing work sharing 
plans. See Summers & Love, Work Sharing as an Alternative to Layoffs by Seniority: Title VII 
Remedies in Recession, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 893 (1976). In Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 
S. Ct. 2576 (1984), however, the Supreme Court decided in favor of seniority, see note 53 infra, 
and ignored the fact that "[t]he preliminary injunction did not require the city to lay off any 
white employees at all. In fact, several parties interested in the suit, including the union, at-
tempted to persuade the city to avoid layoffs entirely by reducing the working hours of all fire 
department employees." 104 S. Ct. at 2602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
12. In traditional, two-tier equal protection review, race is seen prima facie as an irrational 
basis on which to exclude minority persons from neighborhoods, schools, work places, benefit 
programs, and the front of the bus; strict scrutiny has been applied to such suspect classifications. 
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 
(1964). Although neither of us believes that a two-tier approach should be the central focus of 
judicial review of race cases, see, e.g., Dimond, supra note 10, at 7-8 n.19, race-conscious reme-
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II. HISTORICAL REFRAINS AND CONTEMPORARY CHOICES 
For societies, as well as individuals, it often seems easier to wish 
away rather than confront the painful vestiges of past wrongdoing. It 
is not easy to face the dilemmas of causal uncertainty and the disloca-
tions inherent in overcoming caste barriers. It is easier, and often 
more popular, either to posit a clean slate or to wring one's hands over 
the limited effectiveness and counterproductivity of specific remedies 
or of governmental reform in general. Sowell's rhetoric combines all 
of these rationalizations: 
[T]he crusade for civil rights ended years ago. [P. 117.] 
[T]he battle for civil rights was won, decisively, two decades ago. [P. 
139.] 
The scramble for special privilege, for turf, and for image is what contin-
ues today under [the "civil rights"] banner. [P. 117.] 
[T]he mindset [i.e., viewing discrimination as the cause of social and eco-
nomic disparities and segregation between groups] and agenda of the 
past [i.e., overcoming the effects of past discrimination] are no longer 
working. [P. 139.] 
Of course, when discrimination is viewed from the narrower per-
spective of isolated transactions without regard to the larger social 
context, it is even easier to argue that outlawing particular racial 
wrongs affords complete relief. For example, the claim that affirma-
tive action legislation to protect blacks is not appropriate was heard 
during the abolition of slavery just as it is today during the process of 
dismantling caste discrimination.13 It is therefore hardly surprising 
that rhetoric and "reality" similar to that espoused by Sowell were 
embraced as national public policy at another time in our history -
the period from 1883 to 1896, when the Supreme Court marked the 
end of the first Reconstruction. In the Civil Rights Cases, 14 for exam-
ple, the Court held that Congress lacked power to outlaw racial exclu-
sion and segregation in inns, theaters, public conveyances and other 
public accommodations by declaring that, at least as of 1883, the 
freedman had "take[n] the rank of mere citizen, and cease[d] to be the 
dies can be understood as a rational approach to tearing down caste barriers and to overcoming 
their enduring effects. If caste discrimination aimed at subjugating a particular minority group 
has succeeded in inflicting any such systemic injury, group remedies are tailored to fit the group 
wrong. Such rational remedial responses, however, are a far cry from any claim to group rights. 
See Dimond, supra note 10, at 6-10. 
13. For example, in 1864 such claims were made by a member of the American Freedman's 
Inquiry Commission: ''The [N]egro does best when let alone .•.• We must beware of all 
attempts to prolong his servitude, even under pretext of caring for him. The white man has tried 
taking care of the [N]egro by slavery, by apprenticeship, by colonization, and has failed disas• 
trously in all; now let the [N]egro try to take care of himself." Quoted in D. DONALD, CHARLES 
SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 177 (1970). Senator James w. Grimes echoed this senti-
ment during early debates on the Freedmen's Bureau: "Aie they free men, or are they not? If 
they are free men, why not let them stand as free men ... 7" CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2972 (1864). 
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
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special favorite of the laws."15 After all, ran the argument, the Civil 
War Amendments, the earlier Civil Rights Acts, and the Freedmen's 
Bureau had long since abolished slavery and attempted to provide 
something more than formal equality under the law to the former 
slaves. With "the aid of [such] beneficent legislation," wrote Justice 
Bradley for the Court, the freedmen surely had "shaken off the insepa-
rable concomitants of [the] state" of slavery.16 In the absence of a 
clearly identifiable act of discrimination or other default by a particu-
lar State, the Court rejected Solicitor General Phillips' argument that 
the 1875 Civil Rights Act, "considering what must be the social ten-
dency in at least large parts of the country," represented "appropriate 
legislation" by Congress under the enforcement sections of the Civil 
War Amendments.17 
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 18 the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur 
on Jim Crow caste legislation and behavior for decades to come by 
upholding state imposition of segregation. The grounds offered by the 
Court in support of this outrage presage Sowell's current rationaliza-
tions: law "is powerless to eradicate racial instincts . . ., and the at-
tempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the 
present situation. . . . If one race be inferior to the other socially, the 
Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same 
plane."19 
Thomas Sowell's vision for today also echoes other voices that 
15. 109 U.S. at 25. 
16. 109 U.S. at 25. 
17. 109 U.S. at 7 (summary of Sol. Gen. Brief). But see 109 U.S. at 14, 17 (discussed in 
Dimond, supra note 10, at 17 & n.45). Justice Harlan's retort to the majority's sophistry was 
direct: "The one underlying purpose of congressional legislation has been to enable the black race 
to take the rank of mere citizens. . . . At every step in this direction, the nation has been con-
fronted with class tyranny [against blacks]." 109 U.S. at 61-62. 
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
19. 163 U.S. at 551-52. The Court added, if"the enforced separation of the two races stamps 
the colored race with a badge of inferiority . . . , it is not by reason of anything found in the act, 
but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." 163 U.S. at 551. 
In his dissent, Harlan rejoined: "Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in 
the purpose • • . to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white per-
sons. . . . [Such] enactments ... proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior 
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens." 
163 U.S. at 557, 560. Harlan added, of course, the now famous quotation, "Our Constitution is 
color-blind •.•. " 163 U.S. at 559. Read in its full context, however, Harlan's notion resembles 
more an anti-caste than simply a race-neutral standard of judicial review: "[T]here is in this 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution 
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens." 163 U.S. at 559. And 
in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 62 (1883), Harlan had said, "If the constitu-
tional amendments be enforced, ... there cannot be, in this republic, any class of human beings 
in practical subjection to another class . . • ." 
In addition to Sowell, pp. 39-42, others use similar statements made by the proponents of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act some 68 years later to support the concept of "colorblindness." See, e.g., 
Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 999-1000 
(1984). In 1964 as in 1896, however, "colorblindness" meant primarily one thing in contempora-
neous context to civil rights advocates - ending caste subjugation of blacks. Thus, these pleas 
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served to rationalize the end of the first Reconstruction. In arguing 
that cultural drive and individual initiative must substitute for polit-
ical action and race-conscious calls for redress, Sowell offers a pre-
scription similar to that advocated by Booker T. Washington in 1895 
for curing "the Negro problem": 
It is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not at the top . . . . 
. . . In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the 
fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress. 
The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions 
of social equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the enjoy-
ment of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe 
and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing. 20 
Responding to Washington's plea "that black people give up .. 
political power [and] insistence on civil rights," W.E.B. DuBois re-
minded that the "result of this tender of the palm-branch . . . has 
been . . . the disfranchisement of the Negro [and] the legal creation of 
a distinct status of civil inferiority for the Negro."21 DuBois then of-
fered an alternative call: 
[T]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line . 
. [T]he Negro is in danger of being reduced to semi-slavery .... 
. . [T]he hands of none of us are clean if we bend not our energies 
to righting these great wrongs. 22 
With the glacial progress following his calls to confront the color line 
directly, DuBois later came to argue for black self-reliance and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency, but never on the grounds that the color line had 
been eliminated or Jim Crow subjugation by the white majority 
overcome. 23 
for "colorblindness" can be understood more broadly as a call to halt the invidious use of skin 
color to exclude minority persons from the mainstream of national life. 
20. 3 THE BOOKER T. WASHINGTON PAPERS 584-86 (L. Harlan ed. 1974). The sort of com-
promise Washington espoused, of course, served to reinforce the dominant white majority's un-
derstanding. Compare W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 42-44 (1961), with Plessy, 
163 U.S. at 551-52 (quoted in text at note 19 supra), and W. SMITH, THE COLOR LINE (1905), 
and W. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS 77-78 (1940). Indeed, Washington likely borrowed the "separate 
as fingers" analogy from the author of another post-Reconstruction "compromise," Rutherford 
B. Hayes. When Washington was teaching at the Hampton Institute in May 1880, ex-President 
Hayes delivered an address there in which he said: 
We would not undertake to violate the laws of nature, we do not wish to change the purpose 
of God in making these differences of nature. We are willing to have these elements of our 
population separate as the fingers are, but we require to see them united for every good 
work, for national defense, one, as the hand. And that good work Hampton is doing. 
3 THE BooKER T. WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra, at 582-83 n.9. 
21. W.E.B. DuBoIS, supra note 20, at 48-49. 
22. Id. at 23, 52-53. 
23. See, e.g., W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DUBOIS (1968); W.E.B. 
DuBoIS, DUSK OF DAWN (1940). 
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Despite warnings by many to proceed more cautiously, Dr. Martin 
Luther King continued to answer the call of DuBois three score years 
later by leading nonviolent protests. Those protests were met by the 
violent "counter-chauvinism" (pp. 33-34) of whites, for example Bull 
Connor's vicious dogs, clubs, and hoses in Birmingham, Alabama.24 
The results of such concerted political confrontation by blacks with 
the white majority's color line include the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.25 Today we face the choice whether to 
continue the reconstruction process started by the modem civil rights 
movement or, as Washington advised before, to denigrate direct chal-
lenges to discrimination. 
Sowell's rhetoric, in sum, provides a haunting refrain to that which 
marked the end of the first Reconstruction a century ago. It is not too 
much to ask that the nation pause to consider the awful consequences 
of accepting the rationalizations which ended the first Reconstruction 
before embracing Sowell's similar vision of reality today to finish the 
second.26 
III. STRA w MEN 
Sowell, of course, has a ready-made response to this comparison of 
his rhetoric with that of the post-Reconstruction era- a personal and 
sometimes openly bitter epilogue (pp. 123-40) which seeks to charac-
terize criticism of his analysis as merely the toppling of "straw man" 
views that Sowell has never advocated, or as "blind mudslinging" by 
Joe McCarthy-type slanderers. 
While Sowell thus seeks to proclaim "The Degeneration of Racial 
Controversy" (p. 123), an examination of his own work in this book 
24. See M.L. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1963) (Birmingham protest); see also M.L. 
KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM (1962) (Montgomery bus boycott). 
25. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p 
(1982)). 
Economic boycotts directed against employers also contributed to breaking the whites-only 
color bar in public and private employment. See generally M.L. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT, 
supra note 24, at 105-06; H. SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954-1980, at 
146, 149 (1981). Now that the Supreme Court has provided broad first amendment protection 
for such direct action in the economic arena, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
886 (1982), it remains to be seen the extent to which such concerted pressure will be able to 
contribute more generally to the economic advancement of minority Americans. 
26. Commenting on criticisms about his Atlanta Exposition address, Washington expressed a 
view in 1901 quite similar to Sowell's view in 1984: 
My own belief is . • . that the time will come when the Negro in the South will be accorded 
all the political rights • . . entitled to him. I think, though, that the opportunity to freely 
exercise such political rights will not come in any large degree through outside or artifical 
forcing, but will be accorded to the Negro by the Southern white people themselves . . • . 
BOOKER T. WASHINGTON AND HIS CRITICS 30 (H. Hawkins ed. 1974). Compare Sowell: 
"[P]olitics has special disadvantages for ethnic minority groups • • . . [C]hauvinism almost 
invariably provokes counter-chauvinism." P. 32. For an analysis of how the Washington/Sowell 
strategy fared after the first Reconstruction, see C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM 
CROW (1974). 
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reveals that it is Sowell himself who prefers to do battle with straw 
men. Five examples will suffice. First, as Michael Harrington has 
noted, Sowell creates his own straw man civil rights advocate who 
thinks "discrimination is the only reason for statistical differences be-
tween racial and ethnic groups" in order to create "simplistic dichoto-
mies" that can be attacked on the basis of simplistic dichotomies.27 
Yet Sowell's attack, as Harrington points out, is "irrelevant, since I 
know of no serious civil rights partisan who engages in such obvious 
simplifications."28 There is an alternative to the simplistic views that 
only culture, discrimination, or innate inferiority can be the cause of 
current intergroup disparities.29 
Second, Sowell's analysis of cause and effect relationships since 
1954 between periods of civil rights agitation and the passage of civil 
rights laws, and between the passage of those laws and economic gains 
by blacks, is similarly skewed. To dispel the efficacy of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, Sowell points to the greater proportionate gains that were 
made by blacks in high-level professions in the decade before 1964 
than in the decade after 1964.30 But do the gains made in the decade 
before the 1964 Act have nothing to do with the growing black polit-
ical protest fanned by Brown and led by Dr. King?31 Do these gains 
27. Harrington, Straw Men in Struggle (Book Review), THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 11, 1984, 
at 37. 
28. Id. Sowell responds to Harrington's criticisms by calling them "reckless tactics" that 
"betray the desperation" of civil rights advocates confronting his criticism. Letter from Thomas 
Sowell to the Editors, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 9, 1984, at 2. Harrington, however, had opened 
his book review by complimenting most of the works Sowell had previously written. See Har-
rington, supra note 27, at 37. Harrington, of course, is not the only victim of this "reverse 
McCarthyism," le., the notion that all who criticize Sowell are like Joe McCarthy. Others in-
cluded in Sowell's "new McCarthyism," p. 127, are Lem Tucker, Christopher Jencks, Carl 
Rowan, Lester Thurow, Patricia Rqberts Harris, Roger Wilkins, St. Clair Drake and Charles L. 
Black. Pp. 124-3S. 
29. See Part I supra. Civil rights advocates, going back at least to W.E.B. DuBois, have 
realized that strong antidiscrimination enforcement and comprehensive reform, while integral 
elements of racial equality, are not the sole means to achieving it. Wrote DuBois: 
The bright ideals of the past, - physical freedom, political power, the training of 
brains .•.. [t]he power of the ballot. •• the freedom of life ••• the freedom to love •••• 
[w]ork, culture, liberty, - all tJiese we need, not singly but together, not successively but 
together, each growing and aiding each, and all striving toward that vaster ideal that swims 
before the Negro people, the ideal of human brotherhood • • • . 
W.E.B. DUBOIS, supra note 20, at 21-22. 
30. See p. 49. Sowell also makes a vague claim concerning black gains "[i]n other kinds of 
occupations" in the 1940's-the decade of World War II. P. 49. Yet as Professor James Jones 
has recently written: "It is conventional wisdom that during periods of scarce human resources 
marked by war and other periods of intense economic activity there was increased participation 
by Blacks and women in the work force." Jones, The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative 
Action in Employment Economics: Legal and Political Realities 48 (Sept. 1984) (speech at An-
nual Meeting of the American Political Science Association). 
31. The large gap between the promise of Brown and the reality of continuing Jim Crow 
segregation gave Dr. King's repeated calls for racial justice and cries against continued delay in 
addressing the issue a moral claim on the national conscience. See Note, Judicial Right Dec/ara• 
tion and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE L.J. 1743, 1746-48 (198S) authored by Mr. Sper• 
ling. The impact of that civil rights movement is still being felt in all aspects of American life. 
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reflect a "catastrophic . . . politicization of race" resulting from civil 
rights agitation (p. 35)? Does the slowness of the progress after the 
1964 Civil Rights Act in narrowing many of the economic gaps be-
tween blacks as a group and whites show that political action is inef-
fective32 or that the 1964 Civil Rights Act represented but another 
step in the larger task of continuing the second Reconstruction? For 
example, the House Report for the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972 that amended the 1964 Act candidly noted, "Despite the 
commitment of Congress to the goal of equal employment opportunity 
for all citizens, the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
is not adequate" to combat the "recognized . . . prevalence of dis-
criminatory ... practices in the United States .... "33 
Similarly, Sowell challenges the effectiveness of affirmative action 
to remedy disparate employment patterns for blacks and whites by 
citing statistics drawn from the period after the adoption by the De-
partment of Labor of "goals and timetables" in 1971.34 Those statis-
tics, Sowell claims, show no "acceleration in the long trend of rising 
black representation in [professional and technical] occupations" (p. 
49). Whether things would have been worse had there been no such 
affirmative efforts, and the interrelationship between public policy and 
complex economic, business, social, and political factors are never dis-
cussed in Sowell's book. 35 The citation of such simplistic "before and 
after" statistics may be intended only to topple the equally simplistic 
For us, the primary issue raised by Sowell's critique is not the relative efficacy of that movement, 
but whether its business should be declared at an end. 
32. It seems bizarre that Sowell, who begins by asserting that political action is "unpromis-
ing" as a means to economic advancement for black Americans, p. 35, and who then goes on to 
deplore the lack of empirical study, p. 133, never even discusses, let alone analyzes, the effects of 
the economic boycotts conducted by the civil rights movement. Nor does Sowell even mention 
the likes of A. Philip Randolph, Roy Wilkins, Martin Luther King, Jr., or Jesse Jackson. 
33. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CooE CoNG. & 
Ao. NEWS 2137, 2139. The Senate Report added: 
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and pervasive phenome-
non. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms of "sys-
tems" and "effects" . . • and the literature • . . is replete with discussion of . . . 
perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory practices through various institu-
tional devices, and testing and validation requirements. 
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971) (emphasis added). 
34. Equal Employment Opportunity in Apprenticeship and Training, 36 Fed. Reg. 6810, 
6812-13 (1971) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 30.4, 30.5 (1984)). 
35. Economic and employment figures since 1971 can also be interpreted as supporting the 
need for affirmative action. Robert Kuttner and others have described how trends in interna-
tional trade have wiped out hundreds of thousands of middle-class, basic industry jobs, which 
historically have been viewed by some as a vital stepping-stone for the economic advancement of 
minorities and ethnic groups. See Kuttner, The Declining Middle, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
July 1983, at 60-62, 69; see also R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 207-12 (1983). 
Minorities, represented disproportionately on the bottom rung, were hit hard by such trends. 
Blacks with college degrees and luck, writes Michael Harrington, "made gains because of that 
economic trend and because of affirmative action, which does work to limit discriminatory pat-
terns in an expanding labor market but not to create jobs in declining areas of employment." 
Harrington, supra note 27, at 38. 
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"civil rights" straw man posited by Sowell. 36 If the only point of Sow-
ell's exercise is that there is uncertainty concerning the causes of social 
and economic inequalities among groups, we concede the point. This 
concession, however, only begins the dialogue over how to confront 
the continuing gaps between groups. 37 
Third, Sowell argues that Brown v. Board of Education was based 
primarily on "psychological doctrine, without foundation in logic or 
law" (p. 71), and misled subsequent courts into ordering busing to 
integrate schools on the mistaken premise that blacks would learn bet-
ter if placed in schools next to white pupils, because schools with too 
many black students are somehow inherently inferior (pp. 61-72). 
Such charges are unfounded. First, Chief Justice Warren has denied 
that the infamous footnote 11 was a motive force in the Brown deci-
sion. 38 Second, a companion case outlawing segregation in District of 
36. While Sowell repeatedly calls for evidence, see, e.g., pp. 133, 138, he himself relies on 
broad macroeconomic statistics to buttress causal inferences which challenge affirmative action. 
Yet causation at that level is quite complex, uncertain, and subject to diverse interpretations. 
And in the area of anti-discrimination law that Sowell mocks the most, to wit, class-action dispa• 
rate impact cases, pp. 37-60, there are many specific examples of almost revolutionary employ-
ment improvement for blacks. As Douglas B. Huron, a former attorney in the Nixon-Ford Civil 
Rights Division of the Justice Department, has detailed, affirmative action remedies were clearly 
and directly responsible for breaking the exclusive dominance of whites in the Alabama state 
government. See Huron, But Government Can Help, Washington Post., Aug. 12, 1984, at Bl, 
col. 2. In 1972 all of the state troopers, officers and Department of Public Safety support person-
nel in Alabama were white. Only a handful of other state agency employees were nonwhite. 
District Judge Frank Johnson remanded the matter to the state agencies - allowing them up to 
two years - for a remedy. Only after their failure did Johnson order comprehensive affirmative 
relief. Black state troopers now constitute over 20% of the force, and nearly 25% of the support 
personnel are black, owing largely to the state's eventual response to Judge Johnson's decrees. 
Id. 
Nor is this an isolated example. The Detroit Police Department went from 6% black in 1967 
to 27.9% black in 1984 as a result of affirmative action remedies for "invidious racial discrimina-
tion in the Detroit Police Department." N.A.A.C.P. v. Detroit Police Officers Assn., S91 F. 
Supp. 1194, 1199-200 (E.D. Mich. 1984). "Police brutality against citizens has been greatly 
reduced and is almost nil at the present time." S91 F. Supp. at 1206. Affirmative action pro-
grams were also responsible for breaking the color line in other state agencies and state highway 
patrols. See, e.g., Morrow v. Dillard, S80 F.2d 1284, 1288 n.24 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirmative 
action decree to remedy the "all-White Patrol" and "all-white favoritism" in Mississippi Depart-
ment of Public Safety and Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol). Between 1972 and 1982 the 
number of black police officers in the United States increased by 50%. BUREAU OP THE CENSUS, 
U.S. DEPT. OP CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL AllsTRACT OP THE U.S. 420 (1984). Between 1973 
and 1981, the number of blacks employed by state and local governments increased by 49%, 
while the number of hispanics increased by 64%. Id. at 30S. A recent scholarly study has also 
demonstrated the macro-level success of affirmative action. See Leonard, The Impact of Affirma-
tive Action on Employment, 2 J. LAB. EcoN. 439, 4S9 (1984) ("affirmative action has actually 
been successful in promoting the employment of minorities and females"), 
37. Such causal complexity is commonly an aspect of the equity court's task of remedying a 
declared wrong. For example, in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 367 (1977), the Court wrote: 
The denial of Title VII relief on the ground that the claimant had not formally applied for 
the job could exclude from the Act's coverage the victims of the most entrenched forms of 
discrimination. Victims of gross and pervasive discrimination could be denied relief pre-
cisely because the unlawful practices had been so successful as totally to deter job applica-
tions from members of minority groups. 
38. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 706 (1976). 
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Columbia schools never relied on any such "scientific" authority, 39 
and per curiam decisions outlawing segregation in parks, theaters and 
public conveyances followed Brown. 40 Third, most legal scholars have 
also criticized the so-called equal educational opportunity rationale 
claimed by Sowell as the basis for declaring governmentally condoned 
segregation unconstitutional.41 The reason, however, is that the 
Brown decision has an airtight claim to moral and constitutional integ-
rity wholly unrelated to any social science study: those who are in the 
mainstream and in control may not seek to label any group inferior 
and to reduce it to a second-class status.42 Finally, subsequent deseg-
regation decisions in the Supreme Court (and most lower courts)43 
were based expressly on a review of the evidence of governmental and 
39. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). 
40. Only one week after Brown, the Court also vacated a decision upholding Jim Crow laws 
in recreational parks. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatre Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954). Subsequent 
per curiam decisions made clear that the holding in Brown I rested not on a narrow concept of 
equal educational opportunity based on "modem authority," but instead on a broad principle 
condemning state-imposed racial segregation and exclusion. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park 
Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (park facilities); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 
903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of 
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches). 
41. In the years immediately following Brown, leading constitutional scholars criticized foot-
note 11 while applauding Brown's other, and substantially more solid, constitutional foundations. 
See, e.g., Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,430 n.25 (1960); 
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 159 (1955); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and 
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); see also Dimond, 
supra note 10, at 23-27; Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimina-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80 
MICH. L. REV. 462, 510 n.256 (1982). 
42. The core of this claim can be found in Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95: "[T]he policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denot-
ing the inferiority of the Negro group. . • . Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this 
finding is rejected." See Dimond, supra note 10, at 23-25; Dimond, supra note 41, at 509-11. 
Given the outrageous language and rationale of Plessy, see note 19 supra and accompanying text, 
it was long past time for the nation finally to credit the nearly century-old claim of Frederick 
Douglass: "We want mixed schools not because our colored schools are inferior to white schools 
- not because colored instructors are inferior to white instructors, but because we want to do 
away with a system that exalts one class and debases another." 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 289 (P. Foner ed. 1955). This same sentiment was aptly expressed by 
Judge Sobeloffin Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970), in explaining 
the basis for federal judicial intervention in school segregation cases: 
It is not founded upon the concept that white children are a precious resource which should 
be fairly apportioned. It is not . . . because black children will be improved by association 
with their [supposed] betters .... School segregation is forbidden simply because its per-
petuation is a living insult to the black children and immeasurably taints the education they 
receive. This is the precise lesson of Brown. 
43. Sowell cites a Los Angeles busing decision as proof that more recent decisions have or-
dered racial mixing on the false premise that blacks need to sit next to whites in school in order 
to learn. P. 69. In addition to being an isolated example of judicial misperception, see notes 39-
42 supra and 44 infra, this citation is deceiving for several reasons. First, Judge Egly was a single 
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge. Second, his decree was based on a controversial interpreta-
tion of both the evidence (which also included proof of historic discrimination) and the Califor-
nia state (not the federal) Constitution. Third, this state-court decision was later overturned by 
the califomia Court of Appeals. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 113 Cal. App.3d 633, 170 Cal. 
Rptr. 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), ajfd., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). This is hardly sufficient evidence to 
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customary discrimination contributing to segregation and not on any 
assessment of educational inputs and outputs or the supposed educa-
tional harm of segregated (or benefits of integrated) schooling.44 
In sum, and once again contrary to Sowell's claims (pp. 64-68), 
evidence and findings of discrimination, not blind pursuit of any "ra-
cial mixing" (p. 68), have been the hallmark of judicial decisions con-
cerning school segregation.45 Evidence in open court has remained the 
sustain the otherwise unsupported assertion by Sowell that federal courts generally ordered "ra-
cial mixing" unrelated to prior discrimination. P. 68. 
44. Sowell's contention that the "modem authority" cited in footnote 11 contains assump-
tions that "have continued to haunt school desegregation," p. 64, is false. The major Supreme 
Court rulings have been based on evidence and findings of systemic intentional discrimination 
against blacks. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) (Dayton II) 
(desegregation order based on failure to remedy historic dual system); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. 
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455 (1979) (desegregation required because of purposefully segregative 
practices with continuing system-wide impact); Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 413 U.S. 189, 203 
(1973) (city-wide desegregation required after finding of state-imposed segregation in a substan-
tial portion of district); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1971) 
(desegregation required because of the variety of policies used as "potent weapon[s] for creating 
or maintaining a state-segregated school system"); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 
(1964) (desegregation order based on a decade of intentional acts by state and district, including 
closing schools to prevent black students from attending school with whites); Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1, 9 (1958) (describing evasive schemes and even armed force used to exclude black 
students in Little Rock, Arkansas, under the auspices of the state). Indeed, in Keyes, the Court 
expressly eschewed a modified equal educational opportunity rationale, 413 U.S. at 1293-95, 
which had been adopted by District Judge William Doyle. Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 313 F. 
Supp. 61, 83 (D. Colo. 1970). Instead, the Court based its finding of constitutional violation and 
remand for reconsideration of remedy on the standard of proof and evidence of intentional dis-
crimination. 413 U.S. at 208-09, 213-14. 
As for the lower courts, and contrary to Sowell's other assertions, pp. 64, 69-72, they too 
were moved in their rulings by massive proof of intentional discrimination as a substantial con-
tributing factor (not a sole cause) of continuing segregation. See, e.g., Brinkman v. Dayton Bd. of 
Educ., 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978), affd., 433 U.S. 406 (1979); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of 
Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ohio 1977), ajfd., 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. 
Supp. 1218 (D. Del. 1974), ajfd. per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1381; 306 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D.N.C. 1969), ajfd., 
402 U.S. 1 (1971). For a more detailed account of the proof, strategies, and findings in the lower 
courts in the Wilmington, Dayton, and Columbus school cases, see P. DIMOND, BEYOND BUS-
ING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION (1985). 
45. Sowell nevertheless cites the overturning of mandatory busing in Los Angeles in Craw-
ford v. Board of Educ., 113 Cal. App.3d 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), ajfd., 458 
U.S. 527 (1982), as an example of the ineffectiveness of preferential policies: "When mandatory 
busing was overruled and stopped in Los Angeles, school integration continued. There are long 
waiting lists of people of all races for the 'magnet' schools of that city." P. 111. 
For three reasons, Sowell's choice of this example reaches the height of irony. First, such 
voluntary desegregation is required in Los Angeles without any findings of intentional discrimi-
nation because California courts interpret their state Constitution to require desegregation re-
gardless of the cause of such segregation. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 
881, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963). Although Proposition I outlawed mandatory reas-
signments as a remedy in the absence of a federal constitutional violation, California courts still 
require school boards to take other feasible steps to alleviate school segregation under the "re-
sults" approach that Sowell denounces. Pp. 53-60, 65-69. See McKinney v. Board of Trustees, 
31 Cal. 3d 79, 92-93, 181 Cal. Rptr. 549, 642 P.2d 460 (1982). Second, "magnet school" plans, 
like "majority-to-minority" transfer programs, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1971), usually include "preferential" policies of one kind or another. 
Finally, the effectiveness of "magnet schools," standing alone, as a remedy in overcoming (rather 
than increasing) segregation is subject to dispute. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 
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ally of those civil rights advocates who claim that a caste system of 
segregation still divides too much of the country; these advocates ask 
only for a fair hearing of their claim, unobscured by predetermined 
rationalizations for current segregation.46 
Fourth, Sowell's hope that Brown can be understood as a narrow 
ruling barring only discriminatory limits on an individual's choice of 
school (pp. 37-38, 64, 68, 71) is just as wide of the mark. Brown in-
volved more than the right of individual black children to transfer to 
otherwise whites-only schools; it sought a "transition to a racially non-
discriminatory school system, "47 allowing delay in individual transfers 
only because of "the public interest in the elimination of. . . obstacles 
in a systematic and effective manner."48 Sowell's crabbed understand-
ing of discrimination as involving individual transactions removed 
from their socio-historical context is repeated in his discussion of 
Green v. County School Board. 49 The Court did not, as Sowell implies 
(pp. 66-68), reject the ideal of free choice on the assumption that "ra-
cial mixing was considered a good thing" (p. 68). Instead, the Court 
rejected the discriminatory reality of the particular "free choice" plan 
as it operated in 1967 in New Kent County, Virginia.50 Sowell's at-
345-46 (D. Del. 1976). According to former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Drew 
Days III, "experience has shown" that magnet schools "rarely, if ever, will . . . be effective 
without some mandatory student assignment." Days, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan 
Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309, 325-27 n.80 (1984). Days 
cites a recent study by private consultants for the Reagan administration's Department of Educa-
tion: "The districts showing the most progress in districtwide desegregation using magnets em-
ploy a variety of methods both voluntary and involuntary, as part of a total desegregation plan, 
including pairing, rezoning, two-way busing and mandatory assignment." J. LoWREY & Assoc., 
SURVEY OF MAGNET SCHOOLS ANALYZING A MODEL FOR QUALITY INTEGRATED EDUCATION 
32 (1983). See also Dimond, supra note 10, at 42-60 (discussion of systemic market remedies). 
46. See P. DIMOND, supra note 44; Dimond, supra note 10, at 42-48. 
47. Brown v. Board of Educ. [Brown II], 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954) (emphasis added). 
48. Brown Il 349 U.S. at 300. As Judge Wisdom counseled, 
"[S]egregation is a group phenomenon. Although the effects of discrimination are felt by 
each member of the group, any discriminatory practice is directed against the group as a 
unit and against individuals only as their connection with the group involves the anti-group 
sanction." ... With this predicate it is not surprising that Brown II . •• fashioned a remedy 
appropriate for the class. • • • Brown II subordinated the "present" right in the individual 
plaintiffs to the right of Negroes as a class to a unitary, nonracial system - some time in the 
future. 
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 866-67 (5th Cir. 1966) (quoting 
Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. R.Ev. 517, 
523 (1959)). 
49. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
50. The Court makes no mention of any "educational benefit" rationale in its ruling. In-
stead, the Court recites facts which demonstrate that New Kent County ran its schools on virtu-
ally a dual basis, with one school primarily for whites and the other reserved exclusively for 
blacks. See Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42. The Court did not, however, declare freedom-of-choice 
plans unconstitutional per se, even in the context of dismantling dual systems. 391 U.S. at 439. 
Professor Dimond has argued that the basic policy choice concerning pupil assignments to 
schools (compulsory assignment vs. family election) still rests largely with the states. See Di-
mond, supra note 10, at 44-48, 61. Indeed, the refusal of the Court, the Congress, and the states 
to consider the range of available alternatives in remedying the comprehensive caste discrimina-
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tack on the Court, therefore, is irrelevant because much in the Court's 
segregation rulings is lost or obscured in Sowell's translation.51 
Fifth, Sowell's view of the Burger Court's decisions on affirmative 
actions is just as myopic. He misses the many tensions which pull on 
the Court and on the individual justices. Perhaps Sowell's shortsight-
edness derives from his focus on United Steelworkers v. Weber 52 (pp. 
41-42). The case involved a dispute over the legality under the 1964 
Civil Rights Act of an affirmative action program voluntarily adopted 
by United States Steel and the United Steelworkers' Union. Reason-
able minds, of course, may differ over what role the Court should play 
in ascertaining congressional purpose in such cases and what Congress 
specifically "intended" when it did not consider the particular issue 
before the Court. 53 The curious aspect of Sowell's analysis is that he 
never discusses the Burger Court's two major constitutional rulings on 
affirmative action, Fullilove v. Klutznick54 and Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke.55 As a result, Sowell apparently proceeds 
on the false assumption that the Court has either embraced a standard 
of equality of results (p. 42) or adopted Sowell's imagined civil rights 
vision that all group disparities result from discrimination (p. 42).56 
tion wrong, not only in the schools but in all aspects of community life, only serves to obscure 
this issue. Id. at 33-62. 
51. While we do not applaud the Burger Court's segregation rulings, see note SO supra and 
note 71 infra, Sowell's criticism appears to be based on a complete misunderstanding of what the 
Court has ruled and why. 
52. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
53. While Congress did not conclusively sanction or prohibit race-conscious remedies, the 
affirmative plan voluntarily adopted in Weber is consistent both with the overriding purpose of 
the act - ending the "glaring ... discrimination against Negroes which exists throughout our 
Nation," H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE 
HISrORY OF Trrl.ES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964 at 2018, and with the "pre-
ferred means for achieving this goal" - "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance." Alexander 
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
For his attack on race-conscious remedies, Sowell relies on Senator Humphrey's remark that 
§ 7030) "does not require an employer to achieve any kind of racial balance." P. 39 (emphasis 
added). This quotation, however, does not buttress Sowell's claim for several reasons. First, 
§ 703(1) is geared toward defining the violation, not limiting the scope of the remedy. Second, the 
affirmative action plan in Weber was voluntary, not required. Third, Humphrey's comments 
must be read in the context in which they were made, during consideration of an act designed to 
begin to do away with systemic discrimination against blacks as a group. See note 19 supra. 
Finally, Sowell ignores the legislative history for the 1972 amendments to Title VII, in which the 
committee reports cite approvingly to cases involving race-conscious remedies. S. REP. No. 415, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. S n.l (1971). With those examples in mind, the Congress broadened 
§ 706(g) - the remedial provision - so that a remedial decree could include "any other equita-
ble relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(g) (1982}. 
54. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
55. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
56. Weber, Bakke and Fullilove hardly represent a vision of equal results - even from the 
Brennan wing of the Burger Court. Rather, these affirmative action cases offer somewhat mud-
dled plurality decisions which provide clear guidance on only one issue: it is not unconstitutional 
per se for majority-dominated institutions to seek to afford race-conscious relief to members of 
minority groups which have been the butt of past discrimination. 
February 1985] Cultural Determinism 1081 
Sowell, therefore, misses the point of the Court's rulings to date on 
affirmative action: the Court has been unwilling to prohibit responsi-
ble legislative assemblies elected by the people ( expressly Congress, 
but presumably state legislatures as well)57 from grappling with the 
difficult public policy issues raised by a history of discrimination 
against minority out-groups and adopting affirmative action as a rem-
edy. 58 Sowell may wish that the Court would impose a straitjacket to 
outlaw once and for all such legislative consideration of the issue, aris-
ing as it does in a variety of circumstances over time, but the Court 
has generally acted to encourage a broad range of flexible legislative 
responses to the problem, at least for the time being. 59 How such a 
limited role for unelected Supreme Court justices can be labelled an 
51. Fullilove offered important insights into the institutional considerations that may most 
concern certain members of the Court. When it was Congress and not the courts (or unrepre-
sentative faculty admission committees and unelected university regents) devising the remedy, 
the Supreme Court did not apply formalistic right-remedy tailoring notions. See Fullilove, 448 
U.S. at 477-78, 483 (Burger, C.J.); 448 U.S. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring). See generally 
Fiss,Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979); Chayes, TheRoleoftheJudge 
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). Instead, the Court offered strong 
moral as well as constitutional approval of the "minority business enterprise" (MBE) provision 
of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976. Wrote Burger, "The legislative objectives of the 
MBE provision must be considered against the background of ongoing efforts directed toward 
deliverance of the century-old promise of equality of economic opportunity." 448 U.S. at 463. 
Wrote Powell, "Congress properly may - and indeed must - address directly the problems of 
discrimination in our society." 448 U.S. at 499. 
While the opinion in Fullilove was based expressly on the "competence" of Congress to deal 
with a problem "national in scope," 448 U.S. at 478, the underlying rationale rests on a "consid-
ered decision" by an elected legislature and executive. 448 U.S. at 473. This suggests that the 
Court will view as equally legitimate attempts by state legislatures (in contrast to unelected, 
official elites, as in Bakke) to respond, particularly in view of the responsibility imposed directly 
on the states by § 1 of the fourteenth amendment. 
58. While the Court's response in Bakke and Fullilove may be unsatisfactory to those impa-
tient with persistent racial inequality, the Court has at least kept the doors open for the political 
process to confront the problems of systemic wrongs and comprehensive remedies. Concern for 
the costs to be borne by innocent whites has been a major competing claim raised by some 
members of the Court, as well as the Reagan administration, for opposing affirmative action. See 
Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 
514 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Reynolds, supra note 19, at 1004. While the plight of inno-
cent whites affected by race-conscious remedies is an important concern, Assistant Attorney 
General Reynolds seems bent on avoiding consideration of the possibility that the failure to make 
any affirmative efforts also may impose costs on innocent people: the innocent members of mi-
nority communities may not have the same opportunities for advancement as their majority 
counterparts because of the persistent effects of systemic discrimination directed against the mi-
nority as a group. See Part I supra. 
59. The Supreme Court has tended to review "benign" racial classifications with "less" than 
a "strict scrutiny" standard. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Bren-
nan, J., separate opinion). The standards of review of race-conscious classifications can perhaps 
best be understood in light of the anti-caste principle, see Dimond, supra note 10, at 14-15, 37, 
and John Hart Ely's "representation-reenforcing" theory. Writes Dean Ely: 
When the group that controls the decisionmaking process classifies so as to advantage a 
minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and, conse-
quently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking. A White majority is unlikely to 
disadvantage itself for reasons of racial prejudice; nor is it likely to be tempted either to 
underestimate the needs and deserts of Whites relative to those of others, or to overestimate 
the costs of devising an alternative classification that would extend to certain Whites the 
advantages generally extended to blacks. 
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"especially brazen . . . perversion[ ] of the law" (p. 120) is a 
mystery.60 
Sowell's vituperative battles with largely irrelevant or imagined op-
ponents serve only to obscure his analyses of particular programs, 
which are at least thought-provoking. He observes, for example, that 
affirmative action increases employer demand for highly qualified 
blacks but decreases demand for blacks with fewer qualifications or no 
track record (p. 53); that the marketplace does not necessarily impose 
or foster caste discrimination (pp. 80-82); that minimum wage laws do 
not aid black teenagers (p. 87); and that licensing and governmental 
regulation may harm blacks as a group (pp. 87-89). Sowell's rhetoric, 
however, challenges the efficacy of any form of affirmative action and 
largely negates discrimination as a factor in the pervasive segregation 
and substantial inequality still experienced by blacks as a group in this 
country. In his quest to make a case for individual rights to equal 
opportunity and against group claims to equal results, Sowell has for-
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 733 (1974), 
See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 170-72 (1980). 
The anti-caste principle and Ely's "we-they" theory put a different twist on the issue of insti-
tutional competence raised in the text at note 57 supra: close scrutiny will be paid to any classifi-
cation benefiting those who control the classification-making process. The anti-caste principle 
thus offers whites protection from being relegated to a second-class status within a system in 
which they (or any identifiable ethnic or religious minority) are in the minority, instead of protec-
tion from race-conscious attempts to elevate disadvantaged groups to full citizenship. 
Justice Brennan's opinion (joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) in Bakke 
showed a keen understanding of the proper purposes and potential dangers of racial classifica-
tions. Brennan directed the main focus of inquiry into whether the particular classification at 
issue stigmatized or singled out any politically powerless out-group. 438 U.S. at 355-62. Bren-
nan also would apply "strict and searching" scrutiny, 438 U.S. at 361-62, to protect blacks (and 
identifiable white ethnic and religious minorities) against the dangers he articulated in United 
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977) (Brennan, J,, concurring), 
60. The Court has played a similar role in interpreting congressional statutes. For example, 
the apparent conflict in Title VII between seniority and affirmative action drifted through the 
federal courts for several years. In Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), 
however, the Court held that Title VII barred federal courts from modifying a previously entered 
affirmative hiring and promotion consent plan in order to protect the newly employed minorities 
from lay-offs under a bona fide seniority system. The Court left open the issue of whether volun-
tary affirmative action programs and race-conscious decrees based on constitutional rather than 
statutory violations may modify bona fide seniority systems. Despite the far-reaching interpreta-
tion of the Stotts decision by William Bradford Reynolds, see Justice Dept. Declares Win Over 
Quotas, Washington Post, June 14, 1984, at Al, col. 1, at least two lower courts have already 
ruled that the decision has no application where a constitutional violation has been found. See 
NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers, 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984), and Arthur v. Buffalo 
Teachers Federation, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3555 (1984), where the 
Supreme Court refused to review a case similar to Stotts, except that findings of intentional dis-
crimination had been made. 
Perhaps most crucial, however, Stotts leaves Congress with the power to decide whether to 
give greater protection to affirmative action programs. Where the Supreme Court limits its rul-
ings to matters of statutory interpretation, Congress may always show its objection by passing 
new legislation. For example, when the Supreme Court interpreted§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
as enacting a convoluted intent standard, City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), Congress 
responded by passing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, officially adopting a broader 
"results" test. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
(1982)). 
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gotten that another critical individual right and a more complex re-
form vision may still be at issue: the individual right to be free from 
systemic injury and group wrong in a society where caste discrimina-
tion may still play some ugly part. 61 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 
Because of his misreading of judicial decisions, Sowell fails to con-
sider the appropriate role of an antimajoritarian court in reviewing 
legislative decisions designed to benefit identifiable groups who, Sowell 
concedes (pp. 13-14, 74, 109), have been the subject of crippling offi-
cial oppression in the past. Although Sowell may be more certain than 
others of the limited continuing impact of caste subjugation which was 
practiced decades ago, it is surprising that Sowell does not applaud the 
Court for giving elected legislatures as well as private employers, as-
sociations and even lower courts some leeway to grapple with this net-
tlesome issue. Contrary to Sowell's implication (p. 35), this process 
and the Court's warily deferential response to it are a far cry from the 
"politicization of race" that is said to have given rise to, among other 
tragedies, the Holocaust. For the Court to outlaw all legislative con-
sideration of the systemic effects of discrimination and all attempts to 
formulate affirmative responses is to restrict legislative discretion and 
thus to promote judicial activism. 62 The modern Court, of course, has 
61. Sowell's unwillingness to consider social context in analyzing individual freedom from 
discriminatory barriers is glaring in his chapter, "The Special Case of Women." Pp. 91-108. 
Sowell's major claim is that discrimination does not cause differences in pay between men and 
women; rather, "[m]ost of these differences relate to marriage and motherhood." P. 92. After all, 
"[m]arriage increases a man's rate of participation in the labor force compared to single men and 
reduces a woman's labor force participation rate compared to single women." P. 93. 
As with racial matters, Sowell's argument is largely irrelevant, because few women's rights 
advocates would deny that - viewed in a vacuum - marriage and pregnancy-related factors 
affect employment patterns. In matters of sex discrimination, however, Sowell refuses to con-
sider what most of the women's rights legal scholars have claimed - that systematic patterns, 
resulting in part from discriminatory and stereotypical treatment of women, have created institu-
tional biases under which equal opportunity is denied to women even where an individual trans-
action is not tainted by a sexist motive. See generally C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL liARAssMENT 
OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Women 
Workers, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 19 (1979-80); Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor 
Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979); Ginsberg, Gender in the 
Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. Cr. REv. l; Law, Rethinking Sex and The 
Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955 (1984). Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 
(1908), with Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
While discussions of systematic sex discrimination can be complex, Sowell refuses even to 
question what forces and attitudes have created existing institutional arrangments. This blind-
ness allows him to take surprisingly discriminatory positions. For example, Sowell claims that 
sex discrimination against women in the police and fire departments is defensible because, having 
established totally sex-segregated forces, "the introduction of women, as well as homosexuals" 
could compromise performance due to "powerful emotional attachments." P. 24. 
62. In reviewing congressional measures to redress racial discrimination, the Court generally 
has rejected such an active role. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478; City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
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more strictly reviewed even legislative actions by the majority in-group 
that exclude minority out-groups. 63 But that is consistent with at least 
one representation-reenforcing vision of the Court's proper role: pro-
tect the minority out-group from caste discrimination at the hands of 
the majority in-group.64 Consistent with this anti-caste principle, 
whites are also offered judicial protection from any attempt to single 
any of them out for relegation to second-class status, but not judicial 
protection from race-conscious attempts by elected legislatures and ex-
ecutive officials to include minorities in the economic, educational, res-
idential, and social mainstream. 65 
The tougher question for judicial review is what role the Court 
should play in declaring rights and imposing remedies itself. The cur-
rent debate on rights and remedies among the justices66 and the com-
mentators67 focuses primarily on the tension between the judicial 
desire to tailor remedies to do no more than overcome the direct ef-
fects of limited wrongs and the need to provide effective remedies for 
systemic wrongs. At times participants in this debate decry the 
claimed ineffectiveness of certain remedies68 or contend that particular 
officials' actions, when viewed in isolation from one another and the 
underlying social context, have no continuing impacts requiring any 
remedy at all. 69 At other times, sweeping remedies are ordered based 
on findings that the intentionally discriminatory actions of particular 
officials contributed directly to all of the pervasive injury alleged, 
again without regard to the larger social context. 70 
This debate seems trapped within an adjudicative framework that 
sees no role for the judiciary unless the individual wrongdoer can be 
haled into court to answer to specific victims' charges and, once such a 
personal wrong is found, binds the judiciary to provide full compensa-
tion. Given the causal complexities and the extent of the proof of his-
toric caste discrimination that can be marshalled, this narrow 
63. See note 12 supra. 
64. See note 59 supra. 
6S. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3S7-S8, 369-76 (Brennan, J., separate opinion); J, ELY, supra 
note S9, at 170-72; Dimond, supra note 10, at 14; Ely, supra note S9, at 733. 
66. Compare Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1979), with Columbus, 
443 U.S. at 479-83 (Powell, J., dissenting) (analyzed in P. DIMOND, supra note 44, and Dimond, 
supra note 10, at 31-48). 
61. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 57; Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. S85 (1983) 
(characterizing judicial approaches to desegregation cases as either "right-maximizing" or "inter-
est balancing"). 
68. See, e.g., Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 448-Sl 
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing some desegregation plans as employing "self-defeating" 
remedies). 
69. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, S01-24 (1979) (Rehnquist, J,, 
dissenting); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
10. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 4S8-68 (1979); Dayton JI, 443 
U.S. at S34-41 (discussed in P. DIMOND, supra note 44, at 386, 394-402, and Dimond, supra note 
10, at 37 n.141). 
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understanding of public law adjudication and the need for courts to 
match rights and remedies serves to divide the justices into two camps: 
those who seek to limit remedies by minimizing wrongs and those who 
seek to maximize remedies by finding particular official wrongdoing as 
the direct cause of current disparities. 71 
There is, however, another vision of judicial review that may be 
more sensitive both to the Court's proper role and to the complexity of 
the cases raising claims of systemic wrong and wide-ranging harm: 
declare the wrong, require the states to come forward with a commen-
surate remedy, encourage the Congress to confront the problem on a 
broader basis, and then independently review the responses of the re-
sponsible officials and legislatures. Rather than becoming obsessed 
with the costs or necessity of judicial imposition of particular reme-
dies, even the Burger Court could then confront, for example, the evi-
71. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), may represent the most patent example of this 
division. Chief Justice Burger, writing for four members of the Court, refused to review the 
evidence that an area-wide system of community discrimination in housing had combined with 
state-imposed segregation of blacks in one-race schools in the inner city to produce an expanding 
core of "blacks-only" schools within the City of Detroit, surrounded by a steadily receding 
"ring" of "whites-only" schools and communities. 418 U.S. at 728 n.7. Even a scholar sympa-
thetic to restricting busing remedies found this refusal to face the principal issue in the case 
unwarranted. See J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 223-29 (1979). In a separate opinion, 
Justice Stewart went further; he purported to review the extensive evidence and findings of such 
area-wide discrimination, see Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 932-33, 939-40 (E.D. Mich. 
1972); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971), but could find none. 
418 U.S. at 756 n.2. Instead, Stewart concluded that the concentration of blacks in central cities 
was "caused by unknown and unknowable factors." 418 U.S. at 756 n.2. See generally Note, 
Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Interdistrict School Desegregation Remedies, 93 YALE L.J. 
340, 348-53 (1983) (discussing cases in which the Court refused to see a causal relationship be-
tween housing discrimination and school segregation). 
The apparent concern over massive interdistrict busing throughout a major metropolis, see 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 741-45, blinded these justices to the key issue: whether the proof 
and findings of a comprehensive system of containment of black families within a state-imposed 
core in the inner city warranted a holding of unconstitutional segregation. Given the fact that 
the court of appeals had already vacated the district court's order outlining an area-wide remedy 
and remanded for reconsideration in the trial court, see Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 252 
(6th Cir. 1973), the Supreme Court could first have reviewed the violation without addressing the 
remedy (as in Brown I). Instead, the Court acted to absolve suburban white America of respon-
sibility for the ghetto without any meaningful consideration of the basic violation issue. See 
Dimond, supra note 10, at 39-42. Four justices vigorously dissented from the majority's sleights 
of hand. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 757 (Douglas, J.); 418 U.S. at 762 (White, J.); 418 U.S. at 781 
(Marshall, J.). Justice Brennan joined in Justice White's and Justice Marshall's dissents. 
In contrast to Milliken, Justice Stewart wrote for a unanimous Court in Hills v. Gautreaux, 
425 U.S 284 (1976), that the constitutional wrong committed by HUD in restricting the public 
housing choices of blacks to locations within center-city Chicago amounted to an area-wide vio-
lation authorizing area-wide remedies. In Gautreaux, unlike in Milliken, the Court perceived 
that the remedy could be limited to allowing black f~es the choice of moving, if they wished, 
to subsidized housing opportunities in the white suburbs. There was no fear of intrusive reme-
dies, and there was unanimous appreciation of the area-wide nature of the wrong of confining 
black families within blacks-only ghettoes. See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 299; see also Dimond, 
supra note 10, at 39-42. If the Court would concentrate on declaring violations in light of the 
evidence, findings, and constitutional principles rather than fearing the consequences of remedies 
which are better left for initial promulgation by others and ultimate review by the Court on 
another day, there might be both greater consistency and more honesty in the Burger Court's 
segregation rulings. 
1086 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1065 
dence that a caste system of racial ghettoization still divides much of 
the country and declare fully the extent of any continuing wrong. 72 
Because of the progress already made during the second Recon-
struction, the Court is in a better position to speak plainly with us 
about the extent of any continuing caste wrong and about the limits of 
the judicial process in providing specific remedies. Whether large gaps 
would thereby be created between declared rights and judicial reme-
dies and whether such gaps would spur action or reaction should not 
obscure the reality of judicial review: it can serve to remind all of us 
that we have not eradicated discrimination against an out-group just 
because we take down the whites-only signs from neighborhoods, 
schools, and jobs, even if the Court itself cannot open every old door 
and build new ones so that we can all enter together. Where Sowell's 
rhetoric would lead the Court to cut off all discussion of race-con-
scious remedies by condemning affirmative action once and for all, this 
alternative understanding of judicial review would encourage the con-
tinuing dialogue over rights and wrongs and redress in contemporary 
America.73 
CONCLUSION 
We hope that a majority of the people and of the Court are not so 
close-minded in their vision of cultural reality or in the rhetoric of 
equal opportunity to foreclose claims and evidence that a system of 
caste still must be confronted by all our public and private institutions 
before we claim victory in the long struggle to eradicate discrimination 
against blacks in this country. Given our sad experience with the ter-
mination of the first Reconstruction, surely we ought not end the sec-
72. In Brown I and Brown Il of course, the Warren Court did bifurcate consideration of the 
issues of violation and remedy. This does not mean, however, that we approve of all aspects of 
the Brown approach. First, remanding admittedly difficult remedial problems to the legislative 
process or to executive officials does not have to mean accepting all deliberate delay. But see 
Brown Il 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). Imposing deadlines for a timely response by the responsible 
party and judicial ordering of provisional remedies until a meaningful response is forthcoming 
are viable alternatives. Second, the Court can place the duty to come forward with a responsive 
remedy on the appropriate party. In Brown Il however, the Court failed to focus attention on 
the constitutionally responsible party, le., the states, rather than local school districts. Finally, 
Brown l being the powerful declaration that it was, should have been explained in its fullest and 
simplest terms in order to give the ruling its full force politically, legally and socially. See notes 
37-42 supra; see generally Note, Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, supra 
note 31. 
73. See generally Note, Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, supra 
note 31. Professor Dimond has explored this role for the Court from diverse perspectives in race 
cases, see, e.g., P. DIMOND, supra note 44, at 395-402; Dimond, supra note 10, as well as in other 
specific types of cases. See Abrams & Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Con• 
trol of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. R.Ev. 75 (1984). In a forthcoming essay, Dimond 
explores this form of "provisional review" as it applies to the full range of constitutional cases 
that come before the Court. See Dimond, Toward an Alternative Form of Judicial Review under 
the Constitution, HAsnNGS CoNST. L.Q. (forthcoming 1985). 
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ond Reconstruction prematurely, whatever our rationale.74 Any costs 
of grappling with the evidence of discrimination and with our national 
conscience over the need for and forms of affirmative action pale 
before the risks of adopting any color-blind whitewash which stub-
bornly declares that the current conditions and future prospects of ra-
cial minorities and women are culturally determined and not a fit 
subject for any public intervention. The law may have its limits, but 
Thomas Sowell has failed to make his case that we have reached them, 
or that we should declare the second Reconstruction finished. 
74. In the Civil Rights Cases, [109 U.S. at 25] the Court wrote that the Negro emerging 
from slavery must cease "to be the special favorite of the laws." .•• We cannot in light of 
the history of the last century yield to that view. Had the Court in that decision and others 
been willing to "do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, 
what it did • . . for the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves," 
[id., at 53] (Harlan, J., dissenting), we would not need now to permit the recognition of any 
"special wards." 
Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,401 (1978) (Marshall, J., separate opinion). 
